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In summer 2000, good seven years after they had first broken out, the conflicts 
between the EU (European Union) and various of its trading partners, including 
especially the US, over the EU’s banana trade regulation had still not been 
resolved.
1 True, the threat that the conflicts might destroy the ‘broader 
relationship between the US and the EU’ and discredit the dispute settlement 
process of the WTO (World Trade Organization) (de Jonquières 1999) had not 
yet materialized. Nonetheless, despite a renewed WTO ruling in April 1999 that 
the regulation was illegal under international trade law, the conflict’s successful 
resolution could still not be taken for granted. Although the EU had declared its 
willingness  – in principle  – to revise the regulation to make it conform with 
international trade law, it was unclear whether a  qualified majority for such a 
revision could be found in the Council and whether a revised regulation, if 
adopted, would not be challenged again in the WTO. In short, there was still 
some doubt whether the ‘banana splits’ within the EU and between the EU and 
the US could be very swiftly or easily repaired. Diplomats involved in the 
dispute reckoned in late 1999 that it could ‘go on for months yet’ and in March 
2000 that it would not be resolved before the second half of the year (Financial 
Times, 1999a; European Voice 2000a). 
 
Few, if any, product-specific conflicts had proven so immune to 
mediation either within the EU or in trans-Atlantic relations as those generated 
by bananas. No other issue had been contested so frequently and over such a 
long time in the WTO disputes process. In the recent history of the EU, no other 
issue had tested so severely the robustness of the doctrine of the primacy of 
European law over that of the member states. Indeed, as of July 2000, the 
German Constitutional Court was still to pronounce its verdict in a case in which 
the plaintiff argued that the EU regulation was incompatible with the German 
Basic Law and should therefore be declared unconstitutional in Germany. Legal 
scholars had long since begun to speculate whether the  whole EU might ‘slip 
over bananas’ (Everling 1996; Kumm 1998). The conflict over the original 
regulation in 1992 had already been unusually long in a decision-making 
process in any case not renowned for its speed – bananas had actually been the 
last agricultural product for which a single European market had been created 
within the framework of the ‘1992’ programme. 
                                                 
1  This paper is based partly on more than 20 interviews conducted with officials and 
representatives of the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, ministries 
of the German, French, British, B elgian and Dutch governments, the US federal government, 
the World Trade Organization, banana traders’ associations  and European and American fruit 
trading companies. For reasons of confidentiality, these persons are not referred to by name in 
the text. O nly their general institutional affiliations are mentioned. The authors would like to 
thank these persons for their helpfulness and cooperation in the conduct of their research.  
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Why have the EU-internal and, even more so, the external conflicts over 
this ostensibly harmless little yellow fruit proved to be so intractable? And why 
in the first place did the EU come to adopt such a controversial regulation? To 
answer these two – interrelated - questions is the objective of this article. Neither 
the available theoretical literature on public policy nor the available empirical 
literature on EU trade policy or trans-Atlantic trade relations provides many 
clues to explain the ‘mystery’ of the ‘banana splits’. These have not been 
provoked by the factors that have occasionally been identified as lying at the 
root of numerous recent trans-Atlantic trade conflicts. Some of the literature 
suggests indeed that a quite different regulation  - which should not have 
produced such intense conflicts – should have emerged from the EU decision-
making process. Notably, Hanson (1998) has shown that the liberalization of the 
EU’s internal market was not accompanied by a general increase in the level of 
external protection because, under EU decision-making rules, protectionist 
measures could be blocked by a minority of free-trade-oriented member states. 
 
The outcome in the case of bananas was the reverse of that in most other 
sectors. The new EU regulation extended to more or less free banana markets 
the level of protection that had hitherto existed in the most protected and 
regulated markets. Our explanation of the adoption of this regulation prioritizes 
the role in the EU Council of ‘package dealing’, which led on the bananas issue 
to an extreme, virtually ‘winner-take-all’ outcome atypical of the EU’s 
consensus-oriented decision-making process, b ecause some of the free-trade-
oriented member states attached less importance to this issue than to others up 
for resolution at the same time. The ‘winner-take-all’ character of the (initial) 
outcome provided a strong incentive for the ‘defeated’ – external as well as EU-
internal  - interests in the conflict to mobilize to overturn the regulation. At the 
same time, however, once the regulation had been adopted, the very EU 
decision-making rules and norms identified by Hanson as a barrier to a ‘Fortress 
Europe’ made the new ‘protectionist’ status quo very difficult to change.  
 
The proponents and opponents of the regulation required not only motives 
or incentives to try to influence EU banana trade policy. They also required the 
capacity or resources to do so. The explanation for the strength of the opposition 
to the regulation as well as for its initial adoption, and therefore for the 
intractability of the conflict, lies, we argue, in the extent to which the banana 
policy making process on both sides of the Atlantic was ‘captured’ by narrow, 
antagonistic and politically very influential producer and especially trading 
interests. However, although the explanation for the unusual intractability of the 
banana ‘splits’ is located necessarily in the politics and economics of the product 
itself, several international, regional and national variables have combined to 
form a trade policy context that has facilitated the emergence and continuation 
of the conflicts.   
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The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a short 
description of the ‘economics’ of the European and world banana industries and 
markets and of EU member states’ pre-1993 ‘national’ banana policies. In the 
following section, we explore some of the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature for trying to make sense of the banana ‘splits’ and set out in greater 
detail our own explanations of the adoption of the EU regulation and the 
seemingly intractable trans-Atlantic conflict that it provoked. The empirical 
evidence in support of our explanations is provided in the subsequent sections, 
in which we explore the internal and external dimensions of the banana ‘splits’ 
in several stages. Finally we discuss the implications of our analysis in particular 
for the future evolution of wider trans-Atlantic trade relations.  
 
 
2.  Davids & Goliaths: The European & world bananas industries & 
markets 
 
In the late 1980s, some 75 per cent of the world’s banana exports originated 
from Latin America, where the biggest growing states were Ecuador, Costa Rica 
and Colombia. African and Caribbean states (ACPs) and overseas territories of 
EU member states accounted for no more than 15 per cent (Borrell 1994: 5). 
Most of the Latin American bananas were marketed by three then American 
multinational companies: Chiquita, Dole and Del Monte, which together sold 
close to two-thirds (64 per cent) of the world’s exported bananas in 1994 
(Hallam and Peston 1997: 44). The EU consumed almost 40 per cent of the 
world’s bananas, making it the world’s biggest market. At around two-thirds, the 
market share of Latin American bananas in the EU was significantly lower than 
in the rest of the world, and so was the market share of the three American 
multinationals, just under 50% in 1991 (Cadot and Webber 1996: Exhibit 2). 
The EU market was nonetheless Chiquita’s most profitable (interview with fruit-
trading company manager). One-third of the bananas eaten in the EU came – in 
roughly equal proportions – from African and Caribbean states, on the one hand, 
and EU overseas territories, some of which are also located in the Caribbean, on 
the other. The EU’s level of self-sufficiency in bananas was thus a great deal 
lower than for most other agricultural products, including most fruits. 
 
Before 1993, there had been no unified EU banana market, but rather a 
collection of mutually insulated national markets regulated by quite different 
policies. Accounting for more than one-third of EU consumption in the early 
1990s, the German market was the largest and the most dynamic. The volume of 
bananas sold in Germany doubled between the first halves of the 1980s and 
1990s, partly as a consequence of German unification in 1990 (Hallam and 
Peston 1997: 30). It was also the most open, having no import tariff or 
quantitative restriction. As a consequence, Latin American (“dollar”) bananas  
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had a 90% share of the German market and the great bulk of these was sold by 
the American multinational firms, especially Chiquita. Most bananas sold in 
Italy also originated in Latin America. At the other end of the  spectrum were 
France, Britain and Spain, all of which had heavily administered and protected, 
practically closed, bananas markets. All of Spain’s bananas came from the 
Canary Islands. More than a half of the bananas eaten in France were from its 
Caribbean  territories, Martinique and Guadeloupe, and almost all of the rest 
were from two African states, the Ivory Coast and Cameroon. Roughly three-
quarters of bananas imported into Britain came from the Caribbean, more than 
half of them from the Windward Islands (Dominica, Saint Lucia and Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines). The trade in bananas from the EU overseas 
territories and the former British Caribbean colonies was dominated by 
European firms, among which the largest were the British firm, Geest, and the 
Irish-owned company, Fyffes. 
 
The economic costs of the protectionist policies of several EU member 
states were substantial. Calculations (Borrell and Yang 1990, Borrell and Yang 
1992) suggest that consumers paid far more than they would otherwise have 
done  for bananas and that importing companies benefited far more from high 
prices than banana growers in EU overseas territories and ACP countries, 
although the official purpose of such policies was the need to protect the latter 
and not the importers.
2 In the early 1990s, unit production costs of bananas in 
the French and former British Caribbean and the Canary Islands were more than 
twice as high as in Latin America. According to a critical study of EU banana 
policy, ‘climate, topography and soil’ as well as ‘competitive production and 
marketing arrangements’ favoured Latin American bananas over those from 
Africa, the Caribbean and other EU overseas territories (Borrell 1994: 5-6). In 
addition, producers in some of the overseas territories were subject to labour 
regulations patterned after those of metropolitan Europe. EU bananas, according 
to a French government official, were ‘outclassed all down the line: in terms of 
quality, product standardization, presentation, costs, operator resources, and 
integration’ (interview). Given the productivity ‘gulf’ between them and the rest 
of the world, the creation of a single and open European banana market would 
likely have destroyed the bananas industries in the French and former British 
Caribbean and in other EU overseas territories. This could have had serious 
economic and social consequences, as the Martinique reputedly earned between 
60 and 80 per cent and the Guadeloupe over 40 per cent of their ‘export’ 
revenues through the sale of bananas (Hallam and Peston 1997: 2-4). Bananas 
also accounted for between 15 and 20 per cent of the Windward Islands’ GDP. 
Representatives of these states and territories argued – rightly or wrongly – that 
                                                 
2  According to Borrell and Yang, consumers subsidized the industry to a total of $1.6 billion 
through higher prices, but, of this sum, only $302 million accrued to banana growers, 
compared with $917 million to importers.  
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climatic conditions prevented them from diversifying easily into other products 
and  that the abolition of preferential trading arrangements for bananas would 
lead to their economic ruin. The prospect of the creation of a single and liberal 
EU bananas regime was equally unpalatable, moreover, to those  – 
predominantly British, French and Spanish  – trading companies which drew 
their bananas primarily from these regions. 
 
In establishing a new regulatory framework for bananas, the EU had, at 
least on paper, a wide range of options. Of these, German-style free trade was, 
for reasons explained a bove, politically infeasible. But a number of policy 
instruments could have been used, alone or in combination, to shelter overseas 
producers from all-out competition. Apart from tariffs, these included deficiency 
payments (subsidies) and quantitative restrictions. Deficiency payments were 
the least distortionary option. Relative to the overall level of spending on the 
Common Agricultural Policy, the cost of maintaining banana producer support 
at its pre-1992 level ($302 million per year, see footnote 1) would have been 
limited. In principle, this expenditure could have been financed by a tariff on all 
imported bananas at a rate of 17 per cent (Borrell and Cuthberson 1991; Borrell 
1999: 10). However, this solution would have raised internal budgeting issues, 
as, under current budgetary law, EU tariff revenue can not be earmarked for 
deficiency payments (interview with official of international organization). The 
advantage of deficiency payments would have been that they are fully “GATT-
consistent”. The preferential access to ACP producers enshrined in the Lomé 
Convention could have been granted by exempting ACP bananas from tariffs 
altogether. Such a preferential system, being covered by the so-called “Lomé 
Waiver”, would have been GATT-compatible, as was repeatedly confirmed by 
the WTO’s dispute-resolution body (WTO 1999: 74-79).  
 
By contrast, trade regimes based on quantitative restrictions, such as the 
one adopted by regulation 404, are far more distortionary. When competition is 
less than perfect, quantitative restrictions preserve the market power of domestic 
operators more than tariffs, leading in general to greater welfare losses 
(Bhagwati 1965) Quantitative restrictions must also be administered through 
import licences which give rights to the high profits that trade protection 
generates and whose allocation is by itself a source of distortions and “rent-
seeking”. 
 
The regulation 404 on bananas actually adopted by the EU contained a 
mixture of tariffs, quotas and direct subsidies. First, it imposed a tariff of 100 
ecus a tonne on a quota of two million tones of dollar bananas, 400,000 tonnes 
fewer than the EU had imported in 1992. Any dollar bananas imported above 
this quota would be liable to a punitive tariff of 750 ecus a tonne. Second, ACP 
bananas could be imported duty-free, as agreed in the Lomé Convention, up to a  
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quota of 857,700 tonnes, more than the EU normally imported from these states. 
Third, EU growers were to receive direct subsidies for their bananas, up to a 
quota of 854,000 tonnes, a figure that far exceeded the volume of EU bananas 
recently consumed in the EU. Fourth, and most controversially, licences for 30 
per cent of the dollar bananas imported into the EU were allocated to companies 
that traded traditionally in EU and ACP bananas. This provision had a profound 
impact on market shares and revenues, redistributing them from Chiquita and 
north European (‘Hanseatic’) banana traders to their south European 
(‘Mediterranean’) as well as British and Irish counterparts (Van de Kasteele 
1998:12, Borrell 1999: 16, Thagesen and Matthews 1997: 619).
3 The latter 
group of traders actually benefited more strongly from the regulation than EU 
banana growers. According to one analysis, only one-sixth of the costs imposed 
by the regulation on EU banana consumers went back to growers as direct aid 
(Borrell 1994: 12-16 and 1998). The author of this analysis concluded that 
traders of EU and ACP bananas were ‘clearly the main beneficiaries of the 
policy’, while ‘EU consumers, other marketers and Latin American suppliers are 
clearly big losers’ (Borrell 1994: 16). 
 
Given the availability of policy options that were economically more 
efficient and that would undoubtedly have generated less trade friction, why did 
the EU choose this policy  - one that was highly distortionary, unpopular in 
numerous member states, unacceptable to numerous of its trade partners and, as 
subsequent events were to confirm, violated fundamental GATT rules? 
 
 
3. Explaining the ‘banana splits’ 
 
An atypical and extreme policy outcome 
 
The implementation of the EU’s Single Market programme, of which the 
bananas regulation was one component, was not accompanied by a general 
increase in the level of external trade protection. Contrary to widespread initial 
fears that the Single Market programme  would lead to the construction of a 
‘fortress Europe’, internal and external trade liberalization have actually gone 
hand in hand. Hanson attributes this plausibly to a combination of the 
distribution of preferences among the EU member states on external trade issues 
and the effect of the EU’s decision-making rules, Specifically, as trade policy 
decisions can be adopted only by a ‘qualified’ (roughly 70 per cent) majority, a 
‘blocking minority’ coalition of free-trade-oriented, north-west European 
member states has typically been able to prevent the adoption of protectionist 
                                                 
3  As the licences were made tradable, EU and ACP banana traders promptly sold many of 
them straight back to dollar banana traders.  
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external trade measures. Thus, in the case of the automobile industry that 
Hanson analyzes, the policy outcome in the face of ‘1992’ reflected ‘the relative 
bargaining strength of the producing state favouring the most liberal policy’, i.e. 
Germany (Hanson 1998: 79). A crucial question relating to the EU’s adoption of 
an extremely protectionist bananas regulation is why, on this issue, there was no 
blocking minority of liberal member states. 
 
One venerable strand of thought in public policy analysis, pertinent in 
particular to regulatory conflicts, attributes patterns of political conflict and 
policy choices or outcomes to the perceived distributional implications of any 
given policy proposal (Wilson 1980: 366-372). According to Wilson’s famous 
classification, policy proposals whose costs and benefits are widely distributed 
are unlikely to mobilize interest groups and will give rise to ‘majoritarian 
politics’. Proposals that concentrate benefits while distributing costs widely tend 
to lead to outcomes that favour producer interests (‘client politics’). Proposals 
that distribute benefits widely, while concentrating the costs, may succeed in the 
presence of a ‘skilled’ political ‘entrepeneur’ who can ‘mobilize latent public 
sentiment .., put opponents of the plan publicly on the defensive ..,  and 
associate the legislation with widely shared values’ (‘entrepeneurial politics’) 
(Wilson 1980: 370). Finally, proposals that concentrate both costs and benefits 
create strong incentives to organize and try to exercise political influence and 
are therefore conducive to what Wilson labels ‘interest-group politics’. 
Legislation in such conflicts is likely to represent a compromise between the 
antagonistic interests, to contain something, in Wilson’s words,  ‘to please each 
affected party’ (Wilson 1980: 368). 
 
The conflict(s) over the EU’s bananas regulation approximates most 
closely to Wilson’s model of ‘interest-group politics’. The EU’s proposed 
bananas  regulation promised to distribute big benefits to a narrow range of 
affected interests (traders and growers of EU and ACP bananas) and threatened 
to impose heavy costs on a narrow range of other interests (traders and growers 
of dollar bananas) as well as  penalizing consumers in some EU markets by 
raising banana prices. The conflict over the proposed regulation did not lead, 
however, to the outcome expected by Wilson’s model. Rather than being a 
compromise between two sets of narrow interests, the adopted r egulation 
amounted to a ‘winner-take-all’ outcome in favour of EU and ACP bananas 
traders and growers. There was nothing in it at all to ‘please’, and a great deal to 
antagonize, dollar banana traders or growers. 
 
This outcome diverges sharply not only from the outcome that might have 
been expected based on Wilson’s analysis, but also from that which is typical for 
the EU’s own policy-making process, which is characterized by a strong 
orientation towards consensual policy solutions (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace  
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1997: 18, 275, 295; Westlake 1995: 103-104, 110-111; Spence 1995: 375-376; 
Nugent 1994: 145-146; Van Schendelen 1996: 541; Nicoll 1994: 193). Although 
the European Commission, which has the formal right of policy initiation 
according to the European treaties, has relatively wide-ranging trade and 
agricultural competences, almost all decisions in these policy areas require the 
collective approval of the member states represented in the Council. During the 
1990s, especially since the conclusion of the controversial Blair House accord 
on agricultural trade between the US and the EU in 1992, the trend has been for 
the member governments to curtail the external trade policy making autonomy 
of the Commission (Meunier 2000: 132). Depending on the issue area, the 
Council may adopt decisions by a qualified majority or unanimously. In 
practice, there is a strong informal norm to take consensual decisions even 
where, according to the treaty, qualified majority decisions are permissible. The 
history of the EU contains  numerous examples  - most recently that of the 
takeover directive, adopted after more than 10 years of negotiations – of issues 
whose resolution has taken extremely long periods of time and has occurred 
only after virtually all members states’ preferences have been accommodated to 
a greater or lesser extent in the decision finally reached. The bananas regulation, 
with its ‘winner-take-all’ outcome, seems to constitute a striking exception to 
this rule.  
 
Our explanation of this ‘exceptional’ case is located in three specific traits 
of the agricultural (trade) policy making process in the EU. The first of these 
relates to the division of labour in EU trade policy making. In general, the 
competent directorate-general for trade policy is the DG I (in charge of external 
economic relations) and the competent Council that for General Affairs (the 
foreign ministers). According, however, to a division of labour agreed already in 
the 1960s, the ‘lead’ DG for agricultural trade is the agricultural DG VI and the 
‘lead’ Council the Agricultural Council. This division of labour is important for 
understanding the banana split in as far as, compared with DG I and the General 
Affairs Council, the DG VI and the Agricultural Council give greater priority to 
the satisfaction of d omestic (agricultural) interests than to adherence to 
international trade rules and the maintenance of stable and good relations with 
the EU’s trading partners.
4 The second relates to the high degree of sectoral 
segmentation of EU policy making. Compared w ith that of member 
governments, policy in the EU is less closely coordinated across sectoral or 
departmental boundaries, given that there is no EU ‘cabinet’ and no government 
based on political parties with clear programmatic profiles (Héritier 1993: 442). 
As the council formally charged with coordinating inter-Council conflicts in the 
EU, the General Affairs Council may overrule other councils, including that for 
agriculture, but the role and influence of the General Affairs Council has been in 
                                                 
4  On the insularity of the Agricultural Council, see Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 32.  
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a process of decline.
5 Increasingly, the role of arbiter of inter-council conflicts in 
the EU has been exercised, if at all, by the European Council, the organ 
comprising the national heads of government or state.  
 
The third and most important trait of EU agricultural (trade) policy 
making processes that helps to explain the ‘exceptional’ character of the bananas 
regulation relates to the practice of package-deal making used to facilitate 
conflict resolution in the Agricultural Council.
6 Critical to the regulation’s 
adoption in this council’s meeting in December 1992, as we shall see below, 
was the way in which it was incorporated into a larger package containing 
proposals on a large number of different agricultural policy issues. Given the 
legal and/or normative requirement of consensual or near to consensual 
decision-making in the Council and the normally considerable diversity of 
interests among member governments, package-deal making frequently amounts 
to the only available and feasible means of averting political  gridlock. A pre-
condition of successful package-deal making, however, is that member 
governments hold preferences of differing intensities on the issues included in 
the ‘package’ and are prepared to ‘lose’ on some issues as the price for 
‘winning’ on others. The critical question concerning the adoption of the 
bananas regulation is why the preferences of the member states that supported 
the regulation were more intense on this issue than on most others up for 
resolution in the December 1992 meeting, while, for the states belonging to the 
‘Hanseatic’ coalition, the reverse was the case. Why, in other words, did the 
‘Mediterranean’ states, plus Britain and Ireland, ‘care’ more about bananas than 
the ‘Hanseatics’? 
 
The principal reason for the lower priority attached to the bananas issue 
by the ‘Hanseatic’ states is summed up in the remark by a Belgian government 
official that the ministers from these countries had ‘no constituency for bananas’ 
(interview; see below). Of course, they had traders’ and consumers’ interests to 
defend (or not), but the trading companies in these countries had no producer 
interests in the EU (or ACP states) with which they could coalesce. In the 
political debate about the bananas regulation, the ‘Hanseatic’ ministers, unlike 
most of t heir Mediterranean counterparts, were not under pressure from any 
growers, at least not within their own states or, for that matter, former colonies.  
                                                 
5  On the decline in the coordinating role and influence of the General Affairs Council vis-à-
vis other councils, see Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 64-65, Der Spiegel 1998b, Turner 
1998, Barber 1998 and Bulletin Quotidien Europe 1998a. 
6 On the general use of ‘package deals’ as a means of conflict resolution in the EU, see 
Westlake 1995: 119, Spence 1995: 385-386 and Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 254. 
According to EU officials (interviews),  the Agricultural Council is ‘better’ than other councils 
at making package deals, in their view because a relatively large proportion of the conflicts it 
has to resolve are distributive issues more amenable than others to compromise.   
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Hence, they were inclined to prioritize other issues, where important 
domestic agricultural constituencies could be satisfied. This does not mean that 
the banana growers in the EU overseas territories and the former British 
Caribbean were the most influential actors on the issue. Rather, our research 
suggests, the big ‘Mediterranean’, British and Irish banana trading companies 
were more closely involved than growers’ organizations in the policy’s design. 
These companies (see above) also benefited more from the regulation than EU 
and ACP banana growers. The point is that, by coalescing with growers whose 
survival was crucial to the ‘macro-economic’ situation of the banana-growing 
islands and territories and therefore a political issue, the companies could bolster 
their own influence on the regulation.   
 
A further reason for the greater priority attached by the ‘Mediterannean’, 
British and Irish governments than by the ‘Hanseatic’ governments to the 
bananas issue is that the trading companies in the former group of states have, 
over time, developed closer relationships with their respective national 
administrations than their counterparts in the ‘liberal’ national banana markets, 
as the markets in their states have traditionally been more highly regulated or 
‘administered’ and the relationships between the companies and the 
administrations have consequently been closer. The British company, Geest, for 
example, had participated in the making of British banana policy since the 1950s 
(interview of British government official). The contrast in this respect between 
the countries whose banana traders supported the regulation and those whose 
traders opposed it is illustrated by the fact that, while, for example, the Irish 
government was ‘open to an understanding of how Fyffes would like to see the 
market work’ (interview of fruit-trading company manager) and, in the view of 
one participant in the bananas, Geest exercises ‘the same political clout in the 
UK as Chiquita in the US’ (interview of Ecuadorean government official), the 
main banana trading company in the biggest ‘Hanseatic’ state, Germany, had 
quite problematic relations with its national administration, which had no 
tradition of intervention in the bananas market (Wessels 1995).
7 
 
In addition to the above two factors, the bargaining position of the 
member states in favour of a liberal bananas market regulation was prejudiced 
by the stance of the Commission, which was important, given that the Council 
can act only on the basis of a Commission proposal. The Commission’s proposal 
was motivated partially by its analysis of the distribution of preferences on the 
issue i n the Agricultural Council. But the Commission, which, like the Council, 
                                                 
7  The apparently close relationship between Geest and the British government in respect of 
banana trade policy confirms Grant’s characterization of Britain as a ‘company state’ in which 
the most important form of business-state c ontact is the ‘direct one between company and 
government’ rather than, for example, between the government and trade or industry 
associations (Grant 1993: 14).   
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was split on the issue, also has (multiple) preferences of its own. The 
directorate-general in charge of drafting the regulation, the DG VI, undoubtedly 
had a strong preference for a  regulation protecting growers and traders of EU 
bananas. Above and beyond this, according to critics of the regulation, it had an 
additional or wider agenda: to create a European counterweight or European 
counterweights to Chiquita and Dole in the world banana market. Chiquita in 
particular insists that the principal purpose of the regulation was to ‘break the 
power of American multinationals’ (interview of fruit-trading company 
manager). If this was DG VI’s real agenda, it is predictable that the traditional 
traders of EU bananas exercised a powerful influence over EU bananas policy, 
since, given the close ties between Chiquita and the ‘Hanseatic’ banana 
importers, only the former could be European banana ‘champions’ and the DG 
VI’s agenda could be realized only by a regulation which strengthened them vis-
à-vis their North American competitors.
8 
 
The bananas regulation was thus able to be adopted because the 
‘Hanseatic’ EU governments were compensated for their ‘loss’ on this issue 
with ‘victories’ on other agricultural policy issues on the Council agenda at the 
same time. For the governments, the package  as a whole was more or less 
balanced. For the ‘Hanseatic’ and North American banana traders, which, of 
course, had no stake in other issues, the regulation was or at least threatened to 
be disastrous. 
 
An intractable conflict 
 
Current discussions of trans-Atlantic trade relations tend to emphasize two 
reasons for their alleged deterioration in recent times. The first of these is the 
end of the Cold War. According to Gilpin (2000: 9), for example, this and the 
consequent ‘decreased need for close cooperation among the United States, 
Western Europe, and Japan have significantly weakened the political bonds that 
have held the international economy together’. American foreign and economic 
policy has become ‘more unilateral and self-centered’ at the same time as the 
Europeans have grown ‘much more parochial in their economic and political 
concerns than in the past’ (Gilpin 2000: 11). Deteriorating trade relations are a 
function in this view of a fundamental change in the structure of the 
                                                 
8  The European Commission refutes this argument, saying that dollar bananas traders could 
benefit as much from the regulation as other traders, provided they were prepared also to sell 
EU and ACP bananas on the EU market and that, in contrast to Chiquita, Dole’s share of the 
EU market has actually risen since the introduction of regulation 404 (interview of European 
Commission official). Chiquita rejects this argument and maintains that, owing to exclusive 
buying and transport agreements, it was practically impossible for traditional dollar banana 
traders to purchase EU or ACP bananas and transport  them to the European mainland 
(interview of fruit-trading company manager).  
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international system. The problem with this analysis is that it exaggerates the 
degree of change in trans-Atlantic (and Japanese-US) relations during the last 
decade. As Ikenberry (2000: 148) has pointed out, ‘economic disputes have 
remained quite muted’ and it is ‘difficult to argue that the conflicts between the 
United States and its European and Japanese trade partners … have been more 
frequent or intense than such spats were during the Cold War’. In any case, this 
perspective would not be of any assistance in explaining why the most 
intractable trans-Atlantic dispute of the post-Cold War period should have been 
over bananas rather than other products or sectors. In as far as the ‘1992’ 
internal market programme created the pressure to establish a single banana 
market in the EU, the banana ‘splits’ were certainly fostered by the EU’s push to 
closer integration, but this initiative dates back to the early and mid-1980s and 
has nothing to do with the end of the Cold War as such. 
  
The other, increasingly frequently cited, reason for an alleged 
exacerbation of trans-Atlantic trade tensions relates to a widening of the trade 
policy agenda, to the emergence of a ‘new politics’ of international trade. Two 
trends have arguably fuelled this development. The first is that trade 
liberalization efforts are increasingly targeting ‘behind-the-border’ barriers to 
trade or ‘domestic institutional arrangements’ (Ruggie 1994: 516). Such moves 
challenge existing interests more directly and fundamentally and therefore 
arouse more opposition than do, for example, tariff reductions.  This is why, in 
Ruggie’s view, ‘highly politicized trade policy disputes and potential instability 
in trade relations appear to be the virtually inevitable consequence of successful 
liberalization’ (Ruggie 1994: 516). The second, not unrelated, trend relates to 
the growth of ‘post-materialist’ values and politics. This development has 
broadened the agenda of trade politics to include the impact of trade 
liberalization on, for example, the environment and endangered species and 
whether, for example, market access should be granted to products from 
countries where human rights are abused or extensive use is made of child 
labour. It has also, of course, brought new participants into the trade policy-
making process (Destler and Balint 1999). 
 
Some of the tenacious trans-Atlantic trade conflicts that have taken place 
during the 1990s, such as over genetically-modified food and hormone  beef, 
may well fall into this category. These conflicts, according to Vogel (1997: 59) 
have been driven by the pressures of ‘NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] 
and public opinion’. They are, he argues, especially difficult to resolve because 
NGOs and citizens on the two sides of the Atlantic have ‘deeply held and widely 
divergent social and cultural values’ (Vogel 1997: 61). The banana splits, 
however, had as little to do with the growth of post-materialist values and 
politics as they had to do with the end of the Cold War. ‘Public opinion’ played 
at best a marginal role, as did Third World-oriented European NGOs critical of  
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the practices of the US banana multinationals, although, at their insistence, the 
revised regulation adopted by the EU in 1998 did contain some incentives for 
‘fair trade’ in bananas. The banana splits had very much to do with simple ‘old-
fashioned’ trade politics, in which the stakes in the conflicts were market shares 
and revenues and the principal players were narrow organized economic 
interests. 
 
The atypical intractability of this ‘old-fashioned’ trade dispute was related 
to the ‘winner-take-all’ character of the EU’s regulation and the powerful 
incentive that the threat of severe financial losses created for its ‘victims’ to 
mobilize against it, both inside and outside the EU. And mobilize they did – 
with such tenacity in fact that, seven years later, they were still campaigning to 
defeat it, with (see conclusions) an increasing probability of success. In this 
sense, in the long run, Wilson’s analysis may not be far off the mark. Contrary 
to the theory’s prediction, the regulation imposed heavy costs on a concentrated 
group of interests. Owing to their tenacious opposition, however, the ultimate 
outcome of the conflict may be more balanced than the original regulation. In 
this regard, our two ‘puzzles’  – why was the EU’s banana regulation so 
‘extreme’ and why was the conflict over it so intractable – are, of course, two 
faces of the same coin. If finally the banana ‘splits’ are settled in a way that 
offers something to ‘please each affected party’, however, it will have been due 
to the internationalization of the conflict, a phenomenon of which Wilson, in his 
work on regulatory politics in the US, did not take account. 
   
To account f or the intractability of the banana splits, it is necessary to 
explain not only why the regulation’s critics fought it with such zeal, but also 
why they were able to sustain their opposition over such a long period of time 
and to enlist – in the US in particular – the support of powerful political allies as 
well as why the regulation’s exponents were so uncompromising and so 
effective in preventing the regulation’s reversal or substantial revision. In 
addressing these questions, we distinguish between several different types of 
variables – international, regional, national, sectoral and product-specific - each 
of which in turn may be divided into two different sub-types, structural factors 
whose ‘value’ is constant and conjunctural factors whose ‘value’ may change.  
Logically, to the extent that the bananas conflict is unique in terms of its 
intractability, the ultimate explanation of this phenomenon must be located at 
the level of the (politics and/or economics) of the sector. However, the intensity 
and longevity of the banana ‘split’ have also been facilitated and aggravated by 
characteristics of the broader  – ‘temporal’ and ‘spatial’ – setting in which the 
conflict has unfolded. 
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At the regional level, one of the factors, in this case conjunctural, that was 
conducive to the intensity and intractability of the trans-Atlantic banana split 
was that it took place in an era when the supranational organs and member 
governments of the EU were forcing the pace of European integration. Indeed, 
in as far as the internal market programme put a single bananas market on the 
political agenda in the first place, this process and the banana splits were 
inextricably intertwined (see above). In addition to this, however, it is probable 
that the pressure not to imperil major i ntegration projects, such as the common 
currency, induced some member governments not to ‘rock the boat’ on bananas 
once the original regulation was adopted. This was almost certainly one of the 
motives for Chancellor Kohl’s restraint vis-à-vis the French government in the 
bananas conflict in the late 1990s (see below). This ‘closing of the ranks’ in the 
EU intensified the split with the US because it destroyed any hope that the 
American administration might otherwise have had that EU would change the 
regulation at its own initiative. A further conjunctural factor that fuelled the 
trans-Atlantic conflict was the fact that the EU regulation was adopted at 
virtually the same time as the WTO was set up with its new, compared with the 
GATT, tougher dispute settlement rules and procedures. The bananas case was 
the first involving the EU and the US under the new dispute procedures. How 
the two parties dealt with each other in the dispute could set an important 
precedent and help to determine reciprocal expectations of behaviour in future 
WTO conflicts. In particular, the Clinton administration did not want to give the 
EU the impression during the bananas conflict that it would be a ‘soft touch’ in 
simultaneous or pending trade disputes, such as those concerning ‘hormone’ 
beef and genetically-modified foods. This certainly explains in part its resolve 
not to let the EU ‘off the hook’, but rather to insist that the EU implement the 
WTO panel decisions (as the US interpreted them). 
 
The Clinton administration’s tough stance vis-à-vis the EU on bananas 
was not motivated solely or even mainly by the concern not to let a – for the US 
– negative precedent be established. Starting even before the end of the Cold 
War, attitudes in the American public and in the Congress towards free 
international trade and the multilateral trading system grew increasingly critical. 
If the administration had adopted a more accommodating stance towards the EU 
in the bananas dispute, this could have helped to undermine support for the 
WTO and free international trade in the Congress. Congressional sentiment on 
the bananas issue mattered all the more because, from the 1980s onwards, the 
Congress had begun to re-assert its powers in trade policy in the way that it had 
not done since the early 1930s. The US’s pursuit of an overall very liberal trade 
policy after the Second World War was possible only because Congress tied its 
own hands in trade policy by delegating its competences to the executive branch 
(Destler 1995). In so doing, it deflected particularistic interests that could 
undermine this policy towards the executive and away from Congressional  
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representatives, who, given their accountability to constituencies in districts or 
states, are more likely to defer to such interests, other things being equal, than 
the federal administration. As Destler shows (1995: 175-199), for a number of 
reasons, including the demise of the pro-free trade elite consensus and the 
collapse of Democratic-Republican bipartisanship on trade issues, this system 
has been eroding since the 1970s and 1980s. The Congress has imposed 
increasing constraints on the use of powers that it ‘loaned’ to the executive, but 
never gave away permanently. US trade policy has consequently become more 
exposed to the influence of particularistic interests than it used to be and more 
prone to bouts of ‘aggressive unilateralism’ (Bhagwati and Patrick 1990). 
 
Some of the structural traits of the American trade policy-making process 
as it has developed during the 1980s and 1990s are replicated on the other side 
of the Atlantic, in Brussels. The need to bring, or at least the norm of bringing, 
as many member states ‘on board’ as possible on any given issue gives (at least 
in a territorial sense) narrow interests greater scope to influence decisions than 
would be the case in a more highly centralized and majoritarian policy-making 
process. This consensually-oriented decision-making system makes it hard for 
the EU to make radical changes in  existing policies, at least as long as the 
underlying structure or distribution of interests remains unchanged. According 
to Hanson (1998: 56, 70), this explains, of course, why the implementation of 
the single market programme has been accompanied by an overall liberalization 
of EU trade policy – the most free-trade-oriented member states were in a strong 
bargaining position because, if no agreement was reached on measures of 
external trade protection where none already existed, the fall-back position was 
an open market. This was also the ‘point of departure’ in the bananas conflict 
within the EU. Once the ‘blocking minority’ of ‘liberal’ banana states was 
broken and the regulation adopted, however, the new fall-back position was 
extremely protectionist and the EU’s decision-making rules now made it very 
difficult for  the proponents of a liberal banana market to overturn this position 
or even to have it substantially modified. To the extent that they amplify the 
bargaining power of the EU vis-à-vis third states, because the EU can plausibly 
claim that they ‘tie’ its hands (Meunier 2000: 115-117), the same rules also 
strengthened the EU’s resistance to the pressure of the US and other trading 
partners.  
 
So far we have identified a number of factors, located at the international, 
regional or national levels and either structural or conjunctural in nature, that 
shaped the context in which the trans-Atlantic banana split developed. 
Concretely, this context has been moulded by the progression of the European 
integration process, the increasingly prominent role of Congress in the making 
of US trade policy, the propensity of individual or small groups of member 
states to wield strong influence on EU trade policy, and the way in which the  
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practice of package-dealing in the EU Council is used to facilitate the adoption 
of decisions which, if they were voted upon individually, would fail. 
 
Neither individually nor collectively, however, can these variables explain 
why, of all the possible trade issues over which a major trans-Atlantic trade 
conflict could have erupted in the 1990s, bananas was the most intractable and 
most prolonged. One possible answer to this puzzle is that the banana split was 
simply characteristic of a generally conflictual trans-Atlantic relationship on 
issues of agricultural trade. A substantial proportion of t rans-Atlantic trade 
disputes  – a higher proportion than might be expected, given the size of the 
agricultural sector in the overall economy – has to do with agricultural products. 
Thus, of the other trade issues which have led to major trans-Atlantic ‘splits’ in 
the 1990s, two  – ‘hormone’ beef and genetically modified foods  – are 
agricultural. Certainly, the politics of the sector in both the US and the EU does 
exhibit traits that make agricultural trade disputes more probable and more 
likely to be intense and difficult to resolve than those in other sectors. Foremost 
among these is a long history of state intervention and protectionism, especially 
in the EU. In addition, as mentioned above, EU agricultural trade policy, unlike 
trade policy in any other sector, is made by the Agricultural DG in the 
Commission and in the Agricultural Council by the agricultural ministers of the 
member governments.
9 Policy made under these conditions is more likely than 
that in other sectors to prioritize the interests of domestic constituencies over the 
adherence to international trade rules or the maintenance of good relations with 
trading partners where these come into conflict. 
 
   The CAP budget and the EU’s budgetary rules of procedure constitute a 
further sectoral-level variable that has exacerbated the banana split. In principle, 
the trans-Atlantic conflict could have been easily resolved by the EU 
dismantling its quotas and licence allocation system and relying on a 
combination of tariffs and direct payments to growers to protect EU (and, for 
that matter, ACP) production (see above). However, the EU’s budgetary rules 
prevented revenues from tariffs on dollar bananas being ‘earmarked’ to finance 
direct subsidies to producers (Laffan 1997: 37; Weidenfeld and Wessels 1997: 
231-232; interview of official of international organization). Consequently, the 
level of banana tariff revenues had no direct impact on the capacity or at least 
willingness of the EU to fund direct subsidies. Such revenues flowed into the 
general EU budget  and could be extracted from it by the agricultural ministers 
only with the consent of the finance ministers, who, if asked, would hardly have 
been agreeable to changing their budgetary rules of procedure for the sake of EU 
                                                 
9  As Destler (1995: 33-34) points out, the existence of separate committees for agriculture in 
the House of Representatives and the Senate equally has given agricultural interests greater 
leverage over US trade policy in agriculture than is the case for other interests in their 
respective sectors.  
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banana growers, not least since such a change would have created an ominous 
precedent for other products and sectors. Of course, the agricultural ministers 
could have decided to fund increased expenditure on direct subsidies to banana 
growers by increasing overall CAP expenditure or re-allocating resources to 
bananas from other budgetary titles. Even substantially increased spending on 
direct aids to banana growers would not have amounted to a very significant 
proportion of the overall CAP budget. This relativizes the Commission and the 
Council’s argument that such a measure would have been ‘disproportionately 
expensive and burdensome for the Community budget’ (as quoted in Kuilwijk 
1996). However, the option of raising CAP spending nonetheless became less 
and less feasible in the 1990s, as the member governments became increasingly 
concerned to curb the growth of the EU budget and increasingly tight ceilings 
were imposed on CAP spending. The option of budgetary re-allocation was 
possible only to the extent that agricultural ministers could  agree to reduce 
spending on other products, especially other fruits and vegetables. It seems, 
however, that no such consensus existed – thus, in 1999, the Italians in particular 
resisted the idea because 30 per cent of fruit and vegetable spending in the CAP 
budget was already devoted to bananas (rather than to fruits and vegetables 
produced, unlike bananas, in Italy) ( Bulletin Quotidien Europe 1999c). Quite 
apart from the fact that EU banana growers naturally preferred ‘trade to aid’ and 
feared that direct aids, given their highly visible cost, would be more vulnerable 
to being reduced or abolished than primarily tariff- and quota-based protection, 
these internal budgetary constraints also disposed the EU to shift the cost of the 
banana regulation on to external actors, namely the growers and sellers of dollar 
bananas. 
 
Even if the above remarks go some way to explaining the more frequent 
occurrence of agricultural trade disputes than disputes in other sectors between 
the EU and the US, they nonetheless tell us little about why, of all possible 
agricultural products, bananas should have precipitated the most tenacious trans-
Atlantic trade dispute in the last decade. In as far as trade conflicts may be 
considered more likely to occur in products or sectors where the protagonists 
have substantial producer interests to defend, bananas were a rather improbable 
candidate for such a status. Compared with most other agricultural products, the 
EU has a low level of self-provision of bananas, while, Hawaii excepted, 
bananas are not grown at all in the US. Why therefore the banana split rather 
than a beer battle, wine war, chicken conflict, cereals crisis or fights over other 
kinds of fruits? All the variables – international, regional/national or sectoral  – 
identified a bove formed collectively a favourable or propitious context for the 
occurrence of the banana split, but they were not its actual causes. 
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In part, the outbreak of the banana split may be attributed to the fact that 
the regulation 404 effected a sudden and very substantial aggravation of the 
terms of access of American banana traders to the EU market – for which there 
was arguably no parallel for other products and services in the same period of 
time. Also, the Clinton administration saw in the regulation a  flagrant violation 
of international trade rules at a time when, as outlined above, it was under 
pressure from Congress to demonstrate that multilateral trading rules and 
procedures could be used effectively to defend US trading interests. Thus, the 
virtual coincidence of the bananas conflict and the creation of the WTO 
probably made the administration’s stance on the issue more rigid than it would 
otherwise have been. For a time, according to EU sources at least, this rigidity 
was reinforced by President Clinton’s perceived need to shore up his support in 
Congress as impeachment proceedings were pending against him.  
 
The longevity and intensity of the trans-Atlantic banana split may thus be 
attributed at least partly to the fact that the conflict originated at approximately 
the same time that the WTO was created and sentiment towards multilateral 
trade in the Congress was becoming increasingly hostile  – sentiment that the 
administration felt it had to try to assuage. The additional reasons related to the 
banana industry as such lie in the industry’s economics and geography as well as 
in its politics. The salient trait of the economics of the sector is the productivity 
disparity between the dollar banana-growers, on the one hand, and the EU and 
ACP banana industries, on the other. As a consequence of this enormous 
disparity, it was evident that some form of state intervention to protect the EU 
and ACP growers was necessary to prevent the realization of the single 
European banana market resulting in their decimation. The task of designing this 
protection in such a way that it would not fall foul of international trade rules 
was never going to be easy, albeit, for reasons explored above, the EU actually 
chose instruments that just about maximized the likelihood t hat regulation 404 
would be successfully challenged. The salient trait of the geography of the 
industry is the fact that, almost without exception, the EU banana growers are 
located in peripheral, overseas territories that are more or less heavily dependent 
on the banana trade for their economic survival (Hallam and Peston 1997). If 
these industries were to be decimated, the task of generating alternative 
employment and incomes would be significantly harder than in less 
monostructural locations. Moreover, t he member states would have to bear 
follow-on costs (in the form of public expenditure for unemployment benefits, 
etc.) that, under regulation 404, were either imposed on third countries (tariffs 
and quotas) or ‘socialized’ among the member states as a whole (direct 
subsidies). The domestic political fall-out of such a development could have 
been disastrous for incumbent governments or political leaders. Thus, 
Commission officials claimed that the French Prime Minister from 1993 to  
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1995, Edouard Balladur, w ould have committed political suicide if he had 
accepted the abolition of regulation 404 (quoted in Hanke 1994).
10 
 
The salient trait of the politics, as opposed to economics and geography, 
of the industry is the political pressure mobilized, and influence wielded, by the 
highly concentrated particularistic interests that benefited from the regulation in 
the EU and the equally highly concentrated and particularistic interests offended 
by it in the US. Both sets of interests exploited to the full the potential to 
mobilize political support afforded to them in the organization of (agricultural) 
policy-making in their respective political systems. In the case of the US, this 
was, first and foremost, Chiquita, as the only other significant banana trader, 
Dole, had accommodated itself to the regulation. Chiquita’s principal political 
resource in Washington was campaign donations. Chiquita’s determination of 
US policy on bananas provided, a US government official familiar with the 
banana split told us, ‘a classic case for [justifying] campaign finance reform … 
The level of legal corruption has been very extensive’ (interview of US 
government official). The view that Chiquita’s donations and the 
administration’s banana policy are causally related is supported by the fact that, 
on the US side, the White House itself was ‘very much involved’ in determining 
US strategy in the banana split (interview of US government official). There are, 
of course, many historical examples of individual companies or narrow sectoral 
interests exercising a powerful influence over US foreign trade or more general 
foreign policy (Garten 1997: 68; Peterson 1994: 413; Nolan 1999; Mann 
2000).
11 Indeed, Chiquita, whose influence on US policy towards Latin America 
is legendary, itself furnishes some of these examples (Garten 1997: 68). 
President Clinton devoted ‘more time and effort to fund-raising than any of his 
predecessors’ (Mann 2000: 349). Not only his administration’s banana policy, 
but also its stance on trade with China appears to have been strongly influenced 
by individual companies, especially donors to the Democratic Party (Mann 
2000: 349ff.).  
 
The influence of particularistic interests on EU trade and other policies is 
less well explored and known. Alone from the recent past, however, there have 
been suggestions at least that EU environmental policy has been shaped strongly 
                                                 
10  It is not  French public opinion that could have cost Balladur his office if he had 
capitulated on bananas. It is rather that such a  step, especially if it had precipitated social 
unrest in the French Caribbean islands, would have been used against him by the then 
chairman of his party, the current French president, Jacques Chirac, against whom Balladur 
was shaping up to compete for the French presidency in 1995. Spain’s tough stance on the 
second revision of the regulation in 1999-2000 was attributed to the Spanish Prime Minister’s 
concern to maximize his party’s electoral support in the banana-growing Canary Islands. 
Diplomats speculated that, following the governing coalition’s election victory in spring 2000, 
its opposition to such a revision might weaken (European Voice 2000a). 
11  Garten was, for a time, a leading trade official in the Clinton administration.  
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by German car manufacturers and EU policy on aircraft anti-noise pollution 
technology has been tailored to protect the principal European aircraft engine 
manufacturer, Rolls Royce, from American competition (Financial Times 1999b 
and Dunne 1999). The capacity of particularistic interests to influence EU 
policy, compared with that in member states, is enhanced by the relative 
weakness of organizations of collective interest representation in Brussels. This 
is certainly the case for bananas, where, so far as EU banana traders are 
concerned, their European association is prevented by the diversity of its 
members’ interests from taking any clear public stand on EU banana policy and 
the firms look after their political interests by themselves (various interviews). 
The influence of particularistic interests is also bolstered, of course, by the veto 
powers exercised by single or a minority of member governments that may, for 
electoral-political or other reasons (see, for example, footnote number eight 
above), be vulnerable to sanctions threatened by domestic interest groups. 
 
 
4. Splitting over bananas: The EU’s adoption of regulation 404 
 
Bananas have always been an extremely contentious issue within the EU. 
Differences between the member states, mainly France and Germany, over 
bananas threatened to postpone the adoption of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. At 
the final scheduled intergovernmental meeting before the signing of the treaty, 
amid ‘scenes which resembled a bazaar’ (Müller-Armack 1971: 189), the 
German delegation steadfastly refused to acquiesce in a proposal that a 20 per 
cent tariff be applied to all dollar bananas imported into the EU. An agreement 
permitting Germany to continue importing duty-free dollar bananas was finally 
reached at a special bilateral Franco-German meeting convened before the 
treaty-signing ceremony and appended to the treaty as a protocol.  
 
Without the galvanizing force of the ‘1992’ project, the issue of creating a 
single banana market may never have reached the EU agenda. As it was, the 
deliberations within the Commission over what was to become regulation 404 
lasted five years. The three principal directorates-general involved – DG VI for 
agriculture, DG VIII for development aid and DG I for external economic 
relations – had strongly conflicting priorities (see also Stevens 1996: 331). DG 
VI strove to apply to bananas the same principles of community preference, 
‘financial solidarity’ and a common market that had historically underpinned the 
CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). DG VIII’s primary concern was to 
maintain the undertakings made by the EU to the ACP banana-exporting states 
in the Lomé Convention, the last version of which had been agreed in 1988. By 
contrast, DG I’s principal preoccupation was that any regulation be compatible 
with the EU’s international trading obligations laid down by the GATT (later the 
WTO) (interview of European Commission official).  
 
RSCAS 2001/03 © 2001 Olivier Cadot & Douglas Webber  21
By early 1992, the inter-service discussions on bananas had not produced 
an agreed draft regulation. Nor was there any consensus between the organized 
interests with a stake in the regulation. Although the Commission claims to have 
been in ‘constant contact with the different lobbies’ and to have ‘consulted as 
widely as possible’ (interview of European Commission official), the ‘lobbies’ 
reactions to its thinking varied greatly. DG VI’s ideas were particularly 
unacceptable to Chiquita, which identified the main purpose of the proposed 
regulation as being to break or reduce the power of the multinational US banana 
companies. Convinced that it would ‘never get its way in Europe’, Chiquita 
decided that it had to ‘go through Washington’ to try to influence EU policy 
(interview of fruit-trading company manager).  
 
The European banana trading companies, by contrast, appear to have been 
far more effective in shaping the Commission’s, or at least DG VI’s, proposals. 
According at least to a vehement critic of the ultimate regulation, a seconded 
official  from the British Agricultural Ministry played a central role in drafting 
the proposed regulation and the actual architect of the regulation was the British 
fruit trading company, Geest, which had historically exercised a strong influence 
on the British banana regime (Wessels 1995: 136).
12  Together with Fyffes, 
Geest allied itself closely with the (non-French) Caribbean banana growers and 
governments, which, from the beginning, actively lobbied the EU institutions, 
focusing their effort in particular, however, on the British government, which 
they perceived as being their most reliable champion in the Council (Pedler 
1994: 75-76). Similarly, French Caribbean banana-growing interests appear to 
have liaised closely with the French Agricultural Minister (Soisson 1993: 47). 
 
The draft regulation adopted by the Commission at DG VI’s instigation 
corresponded closely to the preferences of the Caribbean-Mediterranean 
coalition hostile to a much greater opening of the EU market to dollar bananas. 
Essentially, the regulation approved by the Commission foresaw the 
introduction of a quota on imports of dollar bananas at more or less existing 
levels, the imposition of a 20 per cent on dollar bananas within this quota, and 
the creation of a licence allocation system for dollar bananas according to which 
30 per cent of the licences for such bananas would have been allocated to traders 
who had hitherto dealt in EU or ACP bananas. The latter measure was proposed 
to give traders in EU or ACP bananas an ‘additional incentive’ to c ontinue 
selling such bananas, as it was anticipated that, following the introduction of the 
proposed single bananas market, the sale of these bananas would become less 
profitable (interview of European Commission official; Stevens 1996: 343; 
Thagesen and Matthews 1997: 618). 
                                                 
12  Majone (1996: 74) describes a perhaps comparable case in which an EU machinery 
directive was strongly influenced by a single British official.  
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The Commission’s proposal was motivated partially by its analysis of the 
distribution of opinion in the issue in the (Agricultural) Council: ‘When the 
Commission makes a proposal, it has to be able to reckon on winning a 
[qualified] majority of votes for it’ (Interview of former member of the 
European Commission). In the EU of the 12 in the early 1990s, there was indeed 
a majority of member states in favour of a ‘protectionist’ banana regime: apart 
from Britain, France and Spain, this m ajority included all the other southern 
member states, which, except for Italy, were concerned to protect their banana-
growing islands, and also Ireland, which had no producer interests to defend on 
bananas, but which was close to Fyffes (see above). There was not, however, a 
qualified (i.e., five-sevenths) majority for the proposal, as the four states – a 
‘Hanseatic’ coalition comprising Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Germany  – 
hostile to the proposal wielded a blocking minority of 23 votes. 
 
German banana  traders alarmed at the Commission’s proposals and its 
drastic implications for their business were reassured by the Bonn Agricultural 
Ministry that it had built up a ‘strong front’ against the proposals with Denmark 
and the Benelux states and that this blocking minority would hold in the Council 
(Wessels 1995: 27). Ominously, however, the Agricultural Minister warned 
them that other issues would have to be weighed up against bananas in any 
‘package deal’ that the Council discussed (Wessels 1995: 37).  
 
Indeed, when the bananas regulation came to a vote in the Council, the 
‘strong front’ of opposition against the regulation disintegrated. The Council 
president, the British minister Gummer, a strong supporter of the regulation, 
assessed the ministers’ relative priorities in bilateral ‘confessional’ negotiations 
and incorporated a revised bananas regulation in a large package comprising 
some 15 other decisions, on issues ranging from the agri-monetary system to 
milk quotas, New Zealand butter and an extension of special subsidies for farms 
in former East Germany. Despite having instructions from his government to 
reject the proposed regulation, the Dutch minister changed sides and voted for 
the package. Compared with bananas, he gave ‘greater weight to other dossiers’ 
(interview of Dutch government official). Gummer had included in the overall 
package proposals on other issues, including the Italian milk quota and the agri-
monetary system, that were advantageous to Dutch farmers, and the minister 
decided ‘milk is  more important for me’ than bananas (interview of Dutch 
government official). For similar reasons, the Belgian minister also abandoned 
the ‘strong’ Hanseatic ‘front’ against the proposed regulation. Although, for 
reasons unrelated to the bananas issue, the Portuguese minister voted against it,  
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along with his German and Danish colleagues, the overall package secured a 
qualified majority in the council.
13  
 
The incorporation of the bananas regulation into a larger agricultural 
policy package was decisive for the regulation’s adoption: ‘If there had been a 
vote just on bananas, the regulation would never have been adopted’ (interview 
of Dutch government official). The British minister had cleverly broken the 
‘Hanseatic’ coalition by exploiting the greater importance attached by the 
Benelux (and, for that matter, also German) ministers to the preferences of their 
core farming clientele as opposed to those of banana traders or consumers. For 
the British and French ministers, in contrast, the bananas issue clearly belonged 
to the most important on the council agenda and they were correspondingly 
prepared to make concessions on other issues to ensure that regulation 404 was 
adopted (on the French minister’s priorities, see Soisson 1993: 118). The British 
presidency’s  banana proposals appear to have taken the German minister by 
surprise. He had turned down a proposal made to him by the  
French minister, apparently expecting that Gummer would be more 
accommodating towards the German position, and was ‘bowled over’ by the 
presidency’s bananas proposals when they were finally made (Soisson 1993: 
119-120). 
 
The non-governmental opponents of the Commission’s draft regulation 
were also surprised at the council decision. Chiquita, for example, had hoped up 
until the ‘very last  moment’ that the proposal would be defeated (interview of 
fruit-trading company manager). Its adoption provoked an outcry in the 
‘Hanseatic’ states, from ports which handled large volumes of dollar bananas, 
such as Zeebrugge, Antwerp and Rotterdam, as well as from banana importers, 
such as the German firm, Atlanta, Chiquita’s largest partner in Germany which 
had invested heavily in expanding its banana-handling capacity in the early 
1990s, and from some of the news media (Wessels 1995). At home, the Dutch 
and Belgian ministers were called to order by their respective governments and 
instructed to vote against the regulation when the final legal text was submitted 
to the next council meeting. Atlanta drew hope from the fact that a new German 
minister appointed in January 1993 appeared to be more strongly opposed to the 
regulation than his predecessor as well as from the passage of the council 
presidency from Britain to an opponent of the regulation, Denmark, and the 
                                                 
13  A German newspaper reported much later that – in the wake of European monetary system 
crisis of summer 1992  - the German minister h ad in fact acquiesced in the regulation in 
exchange for the preservation of the ‘switchover’ mechanism in the agri-monetary system that 
safeguarded German farmers’ incomes against the otherwise negative effects of the 
appreciation of the German Mark against other EU currencies ( Süddeutsche Zeitung 1995). 
The retention of this mechanism also benefited Dutch and Belgian farmers and may therefore 
help to account for the behaviour of their agricultural ministers in the December meeting.  
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mobilization against the regulation of the L atin American banana-exporting 
states (Wessels 1995: 53-57). 
 
With Germany and Denmark continuing to oppose the regulation, the 
reversion of the Dutch and Belgian ministers to their original position should 
have prevented the regulation’s formal approval a t the Agricultural Council’s 
February 1993 meeting. Once again, however, the ‘Hanseatic’ coalition 
crumbled at the decisive moment. On this occasion, supported by his Spanish 
and allegedly also British colleagues, the French minister, whose government 
was facing elections the following month, threatened the Danish presidency that 
if it did not support the regulation, he would try to veto any other decision being 
taken by the council in the ensuing five months (Soisson 1993: 178 and Wessels 
1995: 62). Ostensibly fearful that otherwise the December council package 
would fall apart and have to be ‘re-assembled’ and the council would be 
immobilized during his presidency, the Danish minister capitulated and voted 
for the regulation (interview of Dutch government official). 
 
 
5.  Slipping over ‘banana’ Republicans and Democrats: The offensives 
against the banana regulation  
 
If, in its details, regulation 404 exhibited numerous differences from the 
Commission’s proposal, the proposed and the adopted regulations were 
nonetheless similar in their essentials (Kuilwijk 1996). The most controversial 
aspect of the system was the allocation of 30% of the dollar-banana licences to 
EU importers, which drastically altered market shares. Van de Kasteele (1998, 
Table 4) estimated that Chiquita’s share of the EU market declined from roughly 
a third in 1992 to barely 10% in 1997. The German Agricultural Ministry 
blamed the regulation for a 25 per cent decline in German banana consumption 
and for the fact that average retail banana prices in Germany rose by 50 per cent 
in the second half of 1993 compared with the previous year. The European 
Commission countered that prices had been atypically low in 1992, as banana 
traders such as Chiquita had increased their exports to the EU in an attempt to 
gain market shares, anticipating that licence allocations would be based on past 
volumes (European Commission 1995: 5). 
 
 
The internal offensive against the regulation 
 
Within the EU, the principal critics and victims of the new regulation 
immediately began legal action to try to overturn it. Supported by Belgium, the 
Netherlands and some German banana importers, the German government 
brought a case against the regulation to the ECJ (European Court of Justice),  
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arguing that the 1957 banana protocol still applied, that the regulation was 
injurious to free competition and infringed on the EU’s international trade 
obligations, and that it had caused a sharp rise in German banana prices and the 
loss in Germany of several thousand jobs. The court rejected the complaint in 
October 1994, stressing the wide degree of discretion the Council was entitled to 
exercise in establishing a common bananas market (Wessels 1995: 160).  
 
The ECJ’s decision did not, however, bring to an end to the legal conflicts 
over the regulation. The German government, again supported by Belgium and 
Holland, decided to contest the legality of the Framework Agreement 
meanwhile agreed between the EU and a group of Latin American banana-
exporting states (see below). The German importers, for their part, began to 
contest the regulation through the German legal system. At this level, at least, 
they had some success. State financial and administrative courts handed down 
decisions suspending the regulation’s application in individual cases and the 
FCC (Federal Constitutional Court) confirmed these courts’ jurisdiction on such 
issues – an interpretation subsequently contradicted by the ECJ. In 1996, a state 
administrative court referred a case brought against the regulation by Atlanta to 
the Federal Constitutional Court, which, in its decision on the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1993, had reserved the right to review European law for its conformity with 
the German constitution, thus questioning the doctrine of the supremacy of 
European over national  law that had developed since the 1960s.  If the German 
court ruled that the regulation violated the German constitution, not only would 
the regulation be suspended in Germany, at least until such time as the ECJ 
overruled the judgment and this judgment was enforced by the German 
government, but a fundamental legal conflict would also be opened between the 
two courts over the relationship between national and European law with 
uncertain longer-term consequences for the EU’s cohesion. The FCC apparently 
indicated that it would indeed declare the regulation illegal, on the grounds that 
it violated international law. The government, whilst allegedly sharing the 
FCC’s concrete objections to the regulation, asked the court to consider the 
political damage that would be done if, for the first time in the EU’s history, it 
were to decide explicitly against the ECJ (Der Spiegel 1997). The government 
was reputedly ‘bringing intense political pressure to bear on the court’ to rule 
against Atlanta (European Voice 1998). This pressure may be co-responsible for 
the fact that, by July 2000, the court had still not adjudicated on the case. 
Meanwhile, however, the ECJ had ruled in favour of the federal government in 
its case against the Framework Agreement, on the grounds that  the licence 
allocation system in the regulation violated the principle of non-discrimination, 
and the regulation had also been condemned by the WTO. For the fate of the 
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The external offensive against the regulation 
 
Even before regulation 404 had been adopted, the EU states’ pre-existing banana 
policies had already been under attack from Latin American banana-growing 
states. In spring 1993, a GATT panel found in the Latin Americans’ favour, but 
as, at this time, panel recommendations could be adopted only unanimously and 
the EU opposed the finding, the panel’s verdict remained a dead letter. The 
launching of a case against the new regulation by five of the same states in July 
1993, immediately after it had entered force, had, however, more serious 
implications, as this would be handled according to the more rigorous dispute-
settlement procedures expected to be agreed by GATT member states in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations then in progress. The panel on the new regulation 
also decided against the EU in early 1994, shortly before the new GATT treaty 
was due to be signed and forcing it, short of the regulation’s being revised or 
revoked, to try to find a way to protect the regulation against a challenge under 
the new, for the EU in this case more disadvantageous, dispute procedures. 
 
With the Framework Agreement, concluded in March 1994, the 
Commission succeeded in buying off four of the five Latin American states that 
had brought the complaint against the regulation, essentially by guaranteeing 
them a fixed market share in the new system and, through a system of 
certificates of origin and export licences, transferring to their domestic 
producers some of the quota rents  (interview of official of international 
organization).
14 However, one of the original complainants, Guatemala, refused 
to sign the Framework Agreement and other Latin American states, including in 
particular Ecuador, which did not actually become a GATT/WTO member until 
1995, remained free to contest regulation 404 through the new WTO dispute 
procedures. 
 
So, too, most importantly of all, did the United States. Of the two big 
multinational American trading companies, Dole had decided not to oppose the 
anticipated regulation, but rather to adapt its strategy to take account of its 
anticipated  provisions. In particular, it had taken over numerous EU and ACP 
banana traders and thus safeguarded its potential to continue to export dollar 
bananas to the EU. From 1991 to 1994, Dole increased its share of the EU 
                                                 
14  The German government initially tried to prevent the adoption of the Framework 
Agreement, but the European Commission attached it to the GATT Uruguay Round 
agreement so that (predominantly free-trade-oriented) states that voted against the former 
would have endangered the approval of the latter. The French government also allegedly 
threatened that if Germany opposed the Framework Agreement, it would oppose the proposed 
Uruguay Round treaty provisions liberalizing public purchasing and stop French investments 
in the new east German states. In the end, the German government relented – although it later 
contested the Framework Agreement at the ECJ (Wessels 1995: 115-132).   
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banana market from 11 to 15 per cent (Cadot and Webber 1996: Exhibit 2). 
Chiquita, in contrast, had not diversified its sources of supply, but had carried on 
dealing more or less exclusively in dollar bananas. Its share of the EU market 
plummeted (see above). Unsurprisingly therefore, when the US began to 
contemplate taking action against the EU banana regulation, Chiquita was the 
principal, if not indeed the sole, instigating force. On the application of Chiquita 
and t he Hawaiian Banana Industry Association, the USTR  (US Trade 
Representative’s Office) decided in October 1994, within two weeks of the 
failure of the German government’s complaint against the regulation at the ECJ, 
to launch an investigation of the regulation and the Framework Agreement 
under Section 301 of the US Trade Act, which empowers the US administration 
to take retaliatory action against any trade practices regarded as discriminating 
against American companies. Chiquita’s application was supported by a cross-
party alliance of Senators and representatives including the Speaker of the 
House and both the Senate Democratic and Republican leaders and led by John 
Glenn, Senator from Ohio, the location of Chiquita’s headquarters. Chiquita’s 
principal shareholder, Carl Lindner, and his affiliates were the second-biggest 
donors of ‘soft money’ to the Democratic and Republican parties in 1993-94, 
making donations worth $955,000.
15 According to the head of an American 
NGO, the contributions ‘certainly didn’t hurt Carl Lindner’s efforts to influence 
government action’ (Common Cause 1995: 3). Over a half of the sum was 
actually donated in November and December 1994, just after the launching of 
the Section 301 investigation (Common Cause 1995: 1).
16  
 
The USTR actually abandoned its Section 301 investigation in early 1996, 
after two of the signatories of the Framework Agreement, Colombia and Costa 
Rica, had altered their quota systems to Chiquita’s and Dole’s benefit. Before 
thus foreswearing unilateral trade action, however, it had teamed up with several 
Latin American states, including Ecuador, which did not become a WTO 
member until early 1996, to contest the EU regulation in the WTO. According to 
‘certain sources’ quoted by a European news service, the administration’s 
decision to launch the WTO process was taken within twenty-four hours of 
Lindner having made  - in a Congressional and Presidential election year  – a 
$500,000 donation to the Democratic Party ( Europolitique 1998). The cross-
                                                 
15  ‘Soft-money’ contributions are those in the US that are ‘outside the limits and prohibitions 
of federal law, including large individual or PAC [political action committee] contributions 
and direct corporate or union contributions’ (Common Cause 1995: 10). 
16  According to Tenbrock (1999), Chiquita also made a donation of $500,000 to the 
Democratic Party in April 1994, soon after the US trade representative Mickey Kantor had 
decided to contest the EU regulation at the WTO. This donation can not be verified in the 
statistics published by Common Cause (1995) and the Center for Responsive Politics (1999a, 
1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e). Moreover, the US decision to take the case to the WTO (which 
was not created until 1995) does not appear to have been taken until early 1996.   
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party nature of Chiquita’s political support is evident, however, in the fact that 
Lindner and his affiliates also made substantial donations to Clinton’s 1996 
presidential election opponent, Dole, who made extensive use of Chiquita’s 
aircraft during his campaign and whose avid defence of Chiquita’s interests 
earned him the nickname ‘the banana Republican’ (Financial Times 1995 and 
1996). 
 
The US and its Latin American allies argued that regulation 404 and the 
Framework Agreement contravened numerous provisions of international trade 
law, including the most-favoured nation clause and WTO provisions on trade-
related investment measures and trade in services. As no bananas are grown in 
the US, the latter provisions were critical for the legitimacy of the US’s 
participation in the case. Alone the selection of the members of the bananas 
panel proved ‘extremely controversial’ (interview of official of international 
organization). The WTO chairman Ruggiero was forced to exercise his power to 
choose the panelists – a Swiss lawyer, an Australian economist and a diplomat 
from Hong Kong. The panel’s verdict, which was announced in April 1997 and 
confirmed by the WTO Appellate Body in September 1997, was a severe defeat 
for the EU. The panel found in particular that the licence allocation system 
contravened several provisions of international trade law and was not covered 
by the so-called ‘Lomé Waiver’ that the GATT had granted in 1994 and was 
valid until February 2000. On the issue of how the regulation should be changed 
to conform to WTO requirements, the panel, was silent. It did make clear, 
however, that deficiency payments to overseas banana producers and 




6. A ‘mini-reform’: The revision of regulation 404  
 
WTO rules required the EU to bring regulation 404 into line with international 
trade law by the beginning of 1999. In order to leave sufficient time for its 
implementation, a new regulation had therefore to be adopted by the middle of 
1998. As before, the member states were deeply divided on the issue.
17 In 
                                                 
17  As in 1992, the Commission, too, was deeply split on how to revise the bananas regulation. 
Shortly after the Commission of which he was a member was forced to resign in spring 1999, 
the German Martin Bangemann said: ‘As a Commissioner, I have had to defend our position 
which was made collegially, but I can tell you it’s bullshit’ ( Bulletin Quotidien Europe 
1999a). The head of Atlanta, Chiquita’s main bananas intermediary in Germany, was not 
impressed by Bangemann’s capacity to represent German interests in the bananas conflict. 
After discovering in a conversation with the Commissioner the day the  Agricultural Council 
was to decide on regulation 404 in 1993 that he did not know the issue was on the council’s 
agenda, Atlanta’s head observed that Bangemann ‘did not know what he was talking about … 
How should such a man, who was either badly informed or not informed at all, represent the  
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addition, the parameters of the decision-making process in the EU had 
meanwhile been complicated by the entry of three northern or central European 
states  – Sweden, Finland and Austria  – into the EU in 1995. All three new 
members were natural allies of the northern bloc of member states importing 
mainly dollar bananas from Latin America and favouring a liberal banana trade 
regulation. Alone the revision of regulation 404 to increase the dollar banana 
quota to take into account the fact that these states imported mainly Latin 
American bananas generated so much controversy in the Agricultural Council 
that the Commission was forced to use its market management powers under the 
CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) to  put it into force. The new underlying 
balance of power in the Council increased the danger of its being immobilized 
on the bananas issues. Whilst the strengthening of the ‘northern’ bananas bloc in 
the EU made it much more difficult to enact new protectionist measures, the 
‘southern’ bloc, consisting on the bananas issue of France, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Ireland, the UK and, with qualifications, Italy, was still large enough to 
constitute a blocking minority and prevent any significant weakening of the 
existing regulation. The latter fact would have obliged the Commission in any 
case to propose no greater changes than those considered necessary or 
indispensable to make the regulation ‘WTO-compatible’.  In addition to this, the 
‘northern’ member states, which, in principle, would have preferred a regulation 
based exclusively on tariffs, but many of which also belonged to the most ardent 
defenders of the WTO in the EU, were concerned that the regulation be revised 
within the time span foreseen by WTO rules. This led them to try to avoid a 
fresh and potentially protracted confrontation with the ‘southern’ states on the 
issue. The time factor hence came to play an important role in the EU 
negotiations on a revised regulation and it played into the hands of the 
regulation’s architects and defenders (interview of EU officials). The 
Commission’s proposals to modify the regulation were indeed modest and 
designed primarily to address the WTO panel’s objections to the licence 
allocation systems. Due to their main purpose, namely to make the regulation 
WTO-compatible, international legal issues played a prominent role in the 
Commission’s and Council’s deliberations (interview of EU officials). Whereas 
the Commission’s legal service okayed the proposals as WTO-compatible, not 
all member states  – least of all the Netherlands  - were so convinced. The 
Commission legal service’s argument that an exclusively tariff-based regulation 
would contravene the EU’s legal obligations under the Lomé Convention also 
served to diminish the pressure for more sweeping changes in the regulation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
interests of Germany in Brussels … ?  Clearly he just belonged to the group of those 
politicians who are delegated to Brussels because there is no appropriate job for them in 
Germany’ (Wessels 1995: 61).  
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A further factor that militated against radical changes in regulation 404 
was the fact that, as in the second half of 1992, the British government occupied 
the presidency during the first half of 1998, when the Commission’s proposals 
were submitted to the Agricultural Council. The new Labour government in 
London was just as attached as its Conservative predecessor to the defence of 
the interests of banana-growing former British colonies in the Caribbean – and 
by extension to those of the companies that marketed these bananas. In 
accordance with this council’s established routines, the British presidency 
incorporated the banana proposals with numerous others, relating inter alia to 
olive oil, cereals and agricultural product prices, in a draft, multi-issue ‘package 
deal’. Compared with 1992, the German government adopted a lower profile on 
bananas. The economics and agricultural ministries in Bonn would like to have 
adopted a more combative stance, but were held in check by Chancellor Kohl, 
who is reputed to have told the French president Chirac that the bananas issue 
was ‘your baby  – we’ll let you take care of it’ (interview of European 
Commission official; Der Spiegel 1998a; Süddeutsche Zeitung 1998).
18  In lieu 
of Germany, the Netherlands assumed the role of chief protagonist of changes in 
the regulation. The Netherlands and Denmark were in fact the only member 
states that voted against the revised regulation in the council. At the insistence of 
the French minister in particular, EU banana growers were compensated by a 
more substantial increase in direct payments than originally foreseen by the 
Commission, while Spain in particular was rewarded for its acquiescence in the 
regulation by new olive oil measures also contained in the larger package. The 
potentially most divisive issue, however  - the details of the new licence 
allocation system - was avoided and referred for resolution to the EU’s market 
management committee on bananas.  
 
 
7.  Slipping over Bill and Monica? The new US bananas offensive 
 
If the ardour of the opponents of the original bananas regulation in the EU had 
diminished, this was not true of its critics in the US and Latin America. The US 
administration had been critical of the Commission’s proposals to change the 
regulation from the outset. Before the decisive council meeting, the US trade 
representative had threatened the EU agricultural ministers with sanctions on EU 
exports to the US if the new regulation discriminated against dollar bananas 
(Der Spiegel 1998a). If anything, however, the threat was counter-productive, 
prompting member states to close ranks behind a minimal reform of the 
                                                 
18  The German A gricultural Minister had astonished observers already in September 1997, 
after the confirmation of the WTO panel’s verdict, by stating that ‘out of solidarity with the 
[presumably EU and/or ACP] banana producers’ Germany would fight to keep the EU 
regulation. A spokeswoman of the ministry subsequently added that ‘of course’ the regulation 
had to be changed to conform to the WTO ruling (Süddeutsche Zeitung 1997).  
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regulation (interview of EU officials). Within a month of the new regulation’s 
adoption, the US and five Latin American states (Ecuador, Mexico, Honduras, 
Panama and Guatemala) declared that they would ask for a new WTO panel to 
examine the revised regulation’s compatibility with world trade rules.  
 
The Clinton administration’s tough stance on the regulation appears to 
have been motivated by opposition to the regulation in the Congress mobilized 
by Chiquita and made all the more potent by the pending Congressional 
elections of November 1998 and the president’s implication in the ‘Monica 
Lewinsky Affair’, w hich obliged him to pay particular attention to sentiment in 
the Congress, where impeachment proceedings were about to be launched 
against him. Upon the EU’s refusal to acquiesce in Washington’s demand for 
the reconstitution of a panel to examine the new regulation’s WTO compatibility 
before the regulation was to take effect in January 1999, a bill was initiated in 
Congress that would have mandated the administration to impose sanctions on 
EU exports to the EU by the end of the year. To avert the bill’s imminent 
adoption, President Clinton pledged that the administration would ‘basically do 
what the bill says’ (interview of US government official), namely that it would 
prepare sanctions against EU exports that, failing further changes in the banana 
regulation and following procedures laid down in section 301 of the Trade Act, 
would enter into force in early 1999. The administration subsequently published 




The USTR, Charlene Barshefsky, justified the US’s threat not to await the 
outcome of a prospective future WTO panel on whether the new EU regulation 
conformed to international trade law by its desire to avoid an ‘endless cycle of 
litigations’ (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 1998b). In fact, however, American trade 
officials were unhappy about wielding the sanctions threat, which they feared 
would isolate the US and put it on the defensive on the issue in the WTO. The 
threat was made rather to appease the Congressional supporters of Chiquita, 
which was opposed to submitting the issue of the EU’s compliance with the 
1997 verdict to a new WTO panel. ‘Chiquita was pushing an extreme view 
concerning world trade rules on bananas’, according to an American official 
familiar w ith the case (interview of US government official). ‘For a small 
amount of money [sic], Chiquita has been making US trade policy on this issue’. 
In 1997 and 1998, Chiquita’s holding company, the American Financial Group 
(AFG) or company shareholders and employees actually contributed over $1.4 
                                                 
19  The products on the American sanctions list included, among others, pecorino cheese, 
handbags, cashmere pullovers, cosmetics and coffee machines. No Danish or Dutch products 
were included, as these two states had voted against the revised bananas regulation in the 
Council. In terms of value, 24% of the products were British, 21% Italian, 19% French and 
14% German (Europolitique 1998b).  
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million to American political parties and candidates, giving four-fifths of the 
sum to the Republicans and one-fifth to the Democrats (Center for Responsive 
Politics 1999c). For the first time, the AFG figured among the top ten donors of 
‘soft-money’ contributions, its donations of $1.2 million making it the fifth 
biggest such contributor (Center for Responsive Politics 1999e). Among 
individual as opposed to corporate donors, Chiquita shareholders and employees 
or members of their families were the third biggest donors, contributing almost 
$1.2 million (Center for Responsive Politics 1999d). In Ohio, where Chiquita’s 
headquarters are located, the AFG was by far the biggest donor (Center for 
Responsive Politics 1999a). O ver the six-year period from 1993 to 1998, 11 
members of the Cincinnati Lindner family, Chiquita’s principal shareholders, 
donated as individuals some $1.6 million to US parties (Center for Responsive 
Politics 1999b). Alone in 1998, their contributions to national organizations of 
the Republican and Democratic parties amounted respectively to $670,000 and 
$150,000. The great bulk of these sums were donated in October, 
simultaneously with the Congressional election campaign, the initiative 
launched in Congress to impose unilateral trade sanctions on the EU and the 
administration’s ‘basic’ acquiescence in this strategy (Center for Responsive 
Politics 1999b). EU saw the hand of Chiquita not only in the Congressional 
bananas initiative of October, but also in the failure of a bilateral attempt to 
settle the dispute at the EU-US summit in Washington in December. According 
to EU officials, a tentative agreement was scuttled by the White House because 
it had been rejected by Chiquita and President Clinton’s advisers had 
subsequently judged that ‘offending Mr Lindner [head of Chiquita] could cause 
him to swing impeachment votes against the president’ (Peel and de Jonquières 
1999). 
 
The Chiquita-inspired, hard-line US strategy on bananas propelled the 
administration into a byzantine procedural battle with the EU in the WTO. The 
EU refused at first to negotiate with the US under the threat of sanctions, took 
first steps to launch a WTO panel investigation into the legality of section 301 
and argued of course that the WTO compatibility of its new bananas regulation 
could be determined only after the regulation came into force and by a WTO 
panel, not unilaterally by the US. By January 1999, the two big protagonists in 
the conflict had diametrically reversed the tactics they had been following only a 
few months earlier: the US, which in July 1998 had wanted to launch a new 
WTO panel on the bananas regulation, was opposed to convening such a panel, 
while the EU, initially hostile to the idea, now insisted upon doing so, arguing 
that the new regulation had to be regarded as WTO-compatible, ‘unless the 
opposite was proven’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung 1999). The panel, also requested by 
Ecuador, reconvened in January 1999 with the same composition as in 1996-97. 
Just as US trade diplomats had feared, Washington’s determination to impose 
trade sanctions on the EU before the panel had ruled on the WTO-compatibility  
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of the new bananas regulation alienated it from a large number of WTO member 
states with no stakes in the bananas conflict, ranging from Japan and South 
Korea to India, Indonesia, and Canada. Its growing isolation did not, however, 
dissuade the administration from proceeding to impose sanctions on $570 
million worth of EU exports to the US in March 1999. The US tried to balance 
this step against its perceived WTO obligations by declaring that it would await 
the WTO panel verdict and then levy the higher import duties retrospectively, 
assuming presumably that the verdict was in the US’s favour. 
 
Once again, the verdict was. The panel ruled that, although the EU could 
give preferential duty-free treatment to ACP bananas, the regulation’s quota and 
licensing provisions still discriminated illegally against Latin American 
suppliers and US banana traders. The US victory was not total, however, in as 
far as the panel reduced the value of the EU exports on which the US could 
legally impose sanctions by two-thirds to $191 million. Moreover, a subsequent 
WTO panel, set up at the EU’s request, found that the US had acted illegally in 
imposing  sanctions on EU exports before the bananas panel had issued its 
verdict (Financial Times 2000).
20 
 
Its renewed defeat at the WTO left the EU with three basic options in the 
bananas conflict. First, it could ignore the panel ruling. In this case the US – and 
Ecuador – could continue to impose trade sanctions on EU exports indefinitely, 
trans-Atlantic relations would continue to be aggravated by the banana ‘split’ 
and hostility towards the WTO in the US Congress could intensify. In late 1999, 
the US administration was reportedly coming under ‘intense pressure’ from the 
Congress to increase sanctions on EU exports because it had not yet changed the 
regulation ( European Voice 1999). Second, it could retain the bananas 
regulation while offering compensation to the two states in other areas. The US 
administration made it clear, however, that it would reject any such offer. Third, 
it could of course try to change the regulation again to make it acceptable to 
other WTO member states, so that none would contest the new regulation at the 
WTO or, if they did, the EU could reckon on winning the dispute. This path of 
action ran or would run, however, into two interrelated obstacles, one external 
and the other internal. The external obstacle was that, as the Commission 
established in post-panel negotiations, it was impossible to forge a consensus 
between the involved states on a new, still quota- and licence-based regulation. 
In the case of the US, the apparently conflicting preferences of Chiquita and 
Dole dissuaded the administration from taking any clear position on how the 
regulation should be altered (interview of British government official). Only a 
tariff-based regulation, the Commission argued, stood a chance of being 
                                                 
20  The panel instigated by the EU on the conformity of section 301 in the US Trade Act with 
WTO rules found essentially that the section itself was not illegal, but would be if it were 
used.  
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acceptable or, at least, being defensible in the WTO in case its legality should be 
challenged. The internal obstacle was that there was still no qualified majority in 
the EU Council for a substantial, WTO-compatible revision of the regulation. 
The regulation’s ‘hard-core’ defenders – France, Spain and Portugal - were too 
few to force the EU to appeal against the WTO panel’s verdict, but they still 
appeared to have enough allies in the council – depending on the issue, Greece, 
Ireland and Italy  – to prevent a sweeping or at least a rapid recasting of the 
regulation. Moreover, the position of the UK on the issue seemed still to be 
ambivalent, torn as it was between its loyalty to former British colonies (and 
trading companies) in the Caribbean and its support for the WTO and the 
multilateral trading system. F aced with Commission proposals to move to an 
exclusively tariff-based regulation by 2006, the ‘southern bloc’ insisted that the 
period of transition be extended from six to 10 years and that, rather than being 
automatic, the proposed introduction of a tariff-only regulation be re-assessed 
halfway through this period  ( Europolitique 1999;  Bulletin Quotidien Europe 
1999b). Combined French, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and Irish opposition to 
the Commission’s proposals prevented their adoption when they were put to the 
Council in July 2000 ( Financial Times 2000b). The banana ‘splits’ were now 
roughly a decade old, but the tasks of achieving an intra-EU consensus on the 
issue and making any internally possible regulation internationally ‘viable’ were 
hardly any less intractable than at the beginning. 
   
 
8. Conclusions and implications 
 
The banana ‘splits’ represent  – in intellectual as well as practical terms  - a 
fascinating deviant case in the wider context of EU external trade policy and 
trans-Atlantic trade relations. They are, in a practical sense, a deviant case 
because the formulation and implementation of the great bulk of EU trade policy 
and trans-Atlantic trade relations are conducted in the absence of deep political 
conflicts and of the conflicts that have broken out in EU trade policy and trans-
Atlantic trade relations hardly any has proved so tenacious and so intractable as 
that over bananas, which, after all, account for an infinitesimally small 
proportion of intra-EU and trans-Atlantic trade. They are  a deviant case in an 
intellectual sense because important parts of the literature on EU policy making, 
EU trade policy and public policy analysis would not have predicted that the EU 
bananas regulation would be adopted, at least not with the provisions it 
contained, and because it has proved intractable for quite different reasons than 
those which have been identified as driving numerous other major recent trans-
Atlantic trade conflicts. In this article, we have attributed the original adoption 
of the regulation to a combination of the decision-making rules and norms in the 
EU’s Agricultural Council and the distribution of preferences and preference 
intensities among the member government ministers in the council.  Concretely,  
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the Council presidency was able to destroy a potential ‘blocking minority’ of 
anti-protectionist member governments by playing on the fact that, for these 
governments, which had no producer interests at stake on this issue, other 
agricultural  dossiers were politically important and incorporating attractive 
proposals for these governments on these dossiers into an astutely crafted, larger 
policy ‘package’ in which the bananas regulation  – so important for the other 
governments  - was also subsumed. Because the provisions of the regulation 
were so one-sided and so threatening for the growers and especially traders of 
dollar bananas, the latter interests had a powerful incentive to mobilize against 
the regulation. We have attributed the relatively high intractability of the banana 
‘splits’ additionally to the extent to which, on both sides of the Atlantic, the 
bananas policy making process has effectively been ‘captured’ by two sets of 
antagonistic particularistic interests. This outcome has been favoured by changes 
in the wider context of trade policy making in the EU and the US, most of all by 
the organization of (agricultural) trade policy making processes in the EU and 
the US. The recent reassertion of the supremacy of the member states over the 
European Commission in EU trade policy and the growing trade policy activism 
of the American Congress have arguably increased the influence of 
particularistic interests over trade policy on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
This analysis has stressed the atypical, extraordinary or unique character 
of the  banana ‘splits’. Some elements of the banana ‘story’ can, however, be 
identified in other trans-Atlantic trade conflicts. Of these, the shifting 
distribution of power in EU and US trade policy making facilitating the exercise 
of influence by particularistic interests is the most ominous. Other things being 
equal, this trend presages increasing antagonism in trans-Atlantic relations, 
whereby there is as much reason to fear a growth of protectionism in the US as 
in the EU (cf. Meunier 2000: 132). The increasingly contested nature of 
supranational integration in the EU and the increasing opposition to free trade 
and globalization in the US suggest that the trend itself is likely to strengthen 
rather than weaken.
21  The collapse of the 1999 Seattle WTO summit intended to 
launch a new round of international trade liberalization negotiations is arguably 
an early manifestation of the growing incapacity of the US and the EU to act 
either jointly or singly as ‘motors’ of international trade liberalization.  
                                                 
21  The growing powers and authority of the European Parliament (EP) in the EU may be seen 
as an exception or counter to this trend. It has been argued that the Parliament’s growing 
powers will make the EU more responsive to ‘broader social’ (for example, consumer), as 
opposed to p articularistic economic, interests (Peterson 1997: 17). The banana ‘splits’ do not, 
however, lend any support to this interpretation. The EP, whose trade policy role is only 
advisory, has always ardently supported the bananas regulation. Indeed, in November 2000, it 
was threatening to prevent a revision of the existing regulation by refusing to adopt an opinion 
on it (European Voice 2000b). It is possible that the growing role of the EP will lead rather to 
the formation of ‘iron quadrangles’ comprising the  relevant EP committee and Commission 
directorate-general, national ministries and sectorally organized EU interest groups.  
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  There is, however, at least one glimmer of hope in the sombre story of the 
banana ‘splits’. This is that the trans-Atlantic conflict has so far been fought out 
within the WTO and according to its dispute settlement rules. Whilst the banana 
‘splits’ have seriously tested the WTO’s authority and may have made it more 
difficult for the organization to resolve other important issues, such as the choice 
of a new secretary-general in 1999, and both the US and EU have, at different 
times and to different extents, toyed with the idea of openly flouting its dispute 
rules, neither has ultimately gone as far as to do so. If a durable settlement to the 
intra-EU and trans-Atlantic banana splits should be found, then this will have 
been primarily attributable to the moderating effect of the WTO on the 
combatants. Meunier (2000: 115-119) has portrayed how, in trans-Atlantic 
negotiations,  the EU’s decision-making rules make it unlikely that the US 
would be able to force it to acquiesce in a substantial change in the policy status 
quo. Meunier’s analysis assumes, however, that trans-Atlantic trade negotiations 
take place in an anarchic international political environment. But with the 
transition from the GATT to the WTO with its greatly strengthened dispute 
settlement instruments, trans-Atlantic trade takes place less in an anarchic 
political world than within an international legal regime that may impose 
considerable constraints on the range of  measures that states may deploy in 
international trade conflicts. Both the US and EU supported the strengthening of 
the GATT/WTO’s dispute settlement mechanisms. To the extent that they have 
exercised restraint in the banana ‘splits’, their principal motive has been not to 
undermine the new procedures and heighten the risk that their behaviour would 
thus inflict lasting damage on the multilateral trading system. Certainly, as far as 
the EU is concerned, US threats and menaces as such have not made it more 
ready to make concessions on the bananas regulation. Rather they have had the 
opposite effect of increasing European solidarity in support of the regulation. 
The prospect, on the other hand, that an explicit EU refusal to comply with the 
WTO banana dispute verdicts might undermine the WTO has encouraged the 
member governments to try to develop a WTO-compatible regulation (interview 
of EU officials). The fear that the banana ‘splits’ might damage the WTO as 
well as poison trans-Atlantic trade relations more generally has also motivated 
another development that may facilitate a resolution of the conflict: the 
increased participation in the  dossier of the leadership of the European 
Commission and the Commission’s DG for external trade relations at the 
expense of the agricultural ministers since the second WTO verdict declaring the 
revised regulation i llegal in April 1999.
22 These two developments together 
                                                 
22  The initial Commission proposals to bring the bananas regulation in line with WTO 
requirements were drawn up in 1999 – unusually  – under the supervision of the Commission’s 
deputy secretary general, Bernhard Zepter ( European Voice 1999 and  Bulletin Quotidien 
Europe 1999b). The current external trade commissioner, Pascal Lamy, has pushed hard for a 
revision of the bananas regulation t hat would conform with WTO rules (see, for example, 
Bulletin Quotidien Europe 2000).    
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made it more probable that the banana ‘splits’ would not prove irreparable and 
that neither the European integration process, nor the trans-Atlantic relationship, 
nor the WTO and multilateral international trading system would finally ‘slip 
over’ bananas.  More probable … but not certain – for, as a banana-split-weary 
European Commission official remarked at one stage during the long conflict: 
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